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A careful reading of the recent history of East Asia indicates that there 
are indeed many examples of state violence in the region. As noted at the 
outset, many instances of the worst examples of such violence occurred 
during the Cold War, and violence was often directed against those who 
were regarded as enemies of the regime in power and by extension of the 
state. This conflation between regime and state security that was com-
mon during the Cold War continues to obtain in many countries. Coun-
tries with authoritarian regime types often use such broad conceptions of 
security to legitimize violence against critics. In fact economic develop-
ment in East Asia has often not been accompanied by political develop-
ment that distinguishes between state and regime interests and political 
norms that allow for a plurality of interests and their subsequent contes-
tation within clearly established structural and procedural norms. Rather, 
political elites often seek to entrench their power base and broaden it if 
possible. Additionally, positive economic performance is often used to 
strengthen political legitimacy through performance-based criteria than 
enhance political pluralism.
An important issue is how to systematically think about state vio-
lence in East Asia. Similarly, how does one account for the different con-
ditions under which such violence occurred and for how regimes and 
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countries have dealt with the past? Do such episodes have symbolic value 
in identifying transgressions and unacceptable behavior, and how were 
they reconciled in the national psyche of the countries involved? Do they 
fall into certain categories, and can we create a schema of sorts to better 
analyze these important episodes in the region’s history? In other words, 
are such events comparable at some analytical level, or are they simply too 
discrete and diverse to offer any form of useful comparative information 
that can guide research? Whatever the case may be, the best starting point 
is perhaps to identify aspects of the violence that make them similar as 
well as different in order to at least arrive at some attempt to catalog them.
In some senses the Okinawan case is unique because it occurred dur-
ing conditions of actual war. Interestingly, however, the violence that was 
directed by the Japanese military against civilians was aimed not at for-
eigners but rather at local citizens. The evidence also indicates that the 
military treated the Okinawans with suspicion regarding their loyalty to 
the state and the government in power. So atrocious was the motivation 
behind such thinking and so horrendous the crime inflicted on an inno-
cent civilian population subjected to the perceptions of its own military 
that the topic was left unattended and conveniently forgotten. The fact 
that the Okinawans were an insignificant minority within the national 
scheme of things and had little impact on domestic politics made such 
behavior and denial easier. The Okinawans continue to retain memories 
of the atrocities inflicted on them by the military, owing to their stand-
ing as a minority community, and they see the incident as part of a larger 
pattern of the exercise of state power by a dominant majority. In fact, 
the location of US bases and troops on their territory has also become a 
major point in both local and national politics. Okinawans regard host-
ing US bases as a disproportionate burden borne by them and have regu-
larly voted in local elections against the continued presence of foreign 
troops and bases on their soil. Unfortunately for them, however, even 
well-intentioned local politicians like Hatoyama Yukio, who led the Dem-
ocratic Party of Japan to victory in 2009 on the promise of renegotiating 
the base agreement, have been unable to change the situation. And his 
successors Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko appear less interested in pur-
suing the matter after US support in coordinating Operation Tomodachi 
in March 2011, in the aftermath of the massive earthquake and tsunami 
in the Tohoku region of Japan. If anything, the Japanese government has 
been far more concerned with reconstructing the damaged areas, reset-
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tling the affected population, controlling and monitoring the nuclear fall-
out, and restarting the devastated regional economy.
The Thai and Korean cases occurred under rather similar conditions. 
Both countries were ruled by military authoritarian regimes, which per-
ceived a domestic challenge to their monopoly on power. In both cases, it 
is clear that the nature of the violence was indiscriminate and that what 
was perceived as challenges did not constitute a significant threat to the 
regime in power. The monopoly on violence was clearly utilized as a dem-
onstration of power and the ability to stifle dissent through the use of 
force. In this regard, the violence that ensued was exemplary in nature 
and aimed at both primary and secondary constituencies, while retaining 
the regime in power. The trajectory of domestic political developments 
in Korea was strongly determined by the fate of the two generals-turned-
president who were responsible for the 1980 Kwangju massacre, and the 
movement and generation that harnessed inspiration from the suppres-
sion has paved the way for rising anti-American sentiment since the early 
1980s. In fact, it may be argued that this generation has had a profound 
effect in undermining the security compact that used to previously exist 
between the United States and South Korea. The Kwangju incident served 
as a source of intense embarrassment to the military and helped facilitate 
and entrench an activist political culture as well.1
Conversely, in the case of Thailand, the state never dealt with past 
episodes of violence, and the military continued to use lethal force against 
its own citizens with impunity. The Red Drum massacre in the 1970s was 
only part of a pattern of widespread abuse of power by the army and 
enforcement agencies. However, the events did lead to sufficiently wide-
spread social unrest that the military junta in power was forced to abdi-
cate and allow for a brief democratic interlude from 1973 to 1976. The fact 
that the military has never been called to task for its behavior until today, 
while having undergone a measure of democratic transition, is perhaps 
indicative of the sway that the institution still holds in domestic politics. 
And the inability of the country’s social activists, citizens, and state agen-
cies to hold the military accountable for its excesses also reveals the weak-
ness of these constituencies. The coup against the Thaksin government in 
2006 and the unfolding evidence of the deep linkages between the mili-
tary and the monarchy, especially through the military-dominated Privy 
Council, provides ample testimony to the position of the military.2 The 
utilization of the constitutional and administrative courts to weaken the 
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political opposition and disqualify it from political contestation has also 
greatly weakened the more neutral bureaucratic apparatuses of the state. 
In this regard, Thailand has not undergone the social transformation that 
accompanies economic and political development at the national level 
compared to other countries in the region, although a measure of such 
consciousness does obtain in urban areas.
Another way to interpret the evidence is that the realization of such 
consciousness in rural areas is steadily being thwarted by elites in order to 
retain them in a subordinate and pliant position. Consequently, violence 
used against the civilian population has both instrumental and exem-
plary value—at the former level it entrenches a certain conception of the 
state that is held to be sacrosanct and not subjected to challenge. Dur-
ing the 2011 election that led to the victory of the Pheu Thai Party and 
its leader, Yingluck Shinawatra, the military commander General Pra-
yuth Chan-Ocha continuously reminded the electorate to vote in favor 
of the monarchy—a curious call in a democratic election in a constitu-
tional monarchy. And the military continues to treat the 2011 violence 
against the Red Shirt movement that led to the death of approximately 
ninety persons as a law-and-order issue and prevents attempts to hold it 
accountable for the use of excessive force against mostly unarmed civil-
ian demonstrators. It has also thwarted attempts by the political elite to 
negotiate terms with the Cambodian government in resolving differences 
over the Preah Vihear temple complex that have led to sporadic outbursts 
of violence between the two countries.
The Indonesian case involves violence against civilians within the 
context of Cold War ideology, since it was primarily directed, at least at 
the outset, against members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Com-
munist Party. However, a military authoritarian regime was certainly not 
in place when Sukarno was in power. Sukarno’s notion of Guided Democ-
racy, which characterized the Indonesian political system from 1960 to 
1965, was rule by presidential decree. Sukarno’s linkages to the mili-
tary lay in the nebulous relationship between the nationalist faction in 
domestic politics and the early paramilitary units that engaged the Dutch 
from 1945 to 1949 during the so-called revolutionary period in the coun-
try’s political history. But the military linkages were significantly differ-
ent from those that obtained from military elites in the Thai and Korean 
cases, who were professional soldiers. In what was interpreted to be a 
coup attempt against the government after the assassination of a number 
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of top generals, the blame was squarely placed on the PKI. The military 
involvement in the violence was initially to secure the capital city, Jakarta, 
before the violence spiraled out of control. The situation was aided and 
abetted by paramilitary and Muslim youth groups opposed to the PKI. 
Douglas Kammen’s chapter in this volume indicates that leading military 
commanders often took the initiative regarding whether they should be 
involved in the violence and how severely the purge would be carried out. 
As a result of this initiative, Kammen thinks that it would be unfair to 
identify the state as the source of the violence. The outbreak of violence 
was left unchecked for a long period of time and clearly had a certain pat-
tern that lasted until 1968 in Kalimantan.
The massive violence that resulted in almost five hundred thousand 
deaths eventually paved the way for regime transition, leading to the 
installation of Soeharto’s New Order government in 1967. This case quite 
clearly concerns regime transition, and the violence was exemplary, with 
the PKI as the primary audience and other potential future challengers as 
the secondary audience. Soeharto’s personal involvement in the restora-
tion of order as the head of the Army Strategic Command in Jakarta and 
his staunch anti-communist credentials meant that the massacres were 
not investigated. In fact, if anything, the state continued to purge those 
accused of communist leanings, and communism became an easy way 
to brand political opponents as enemies of the state. Soeharto’s lengthy 
tenure in office and the relative success of his corporatist developmen-
talist regime also meant that he decided how history was to be inter-
preted. The ban on research and alternative interpretations of what had 
transpired between 1965 and 1968 has for the most part sealed the New 
Order regime’s interpretation of events as sacrosanct. Since many of the 
country’s senior military commanders were implicated in the violence 
and Soeharto’s own support base derived from the military, there was no 
question of any kind of fact finding regarding what actually transpired 
during the transitionary period. And although Indonesia has been a sta-
ble democracy since the election of the Yudhoyono government in 2004, 
there has been little effort at uncovering the past. The military is keen to 
retain its corporate identity and remains an important player in domestic 
politics. Leading figures in the present government as well as the opposi-
tion were also previously from the military, which makes investigation of 
past misdeeds problematic.
The Cambodian mass killing, by far the worst of the cases doc-
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umented here, in terms of both the number of casualties and the 
extended period of violence, occurred under a military regime of sorts. 
The Khmer Rouge was clearly a military force with hierarchical com-
mand and control structures and a clearly defined strategy of warfare 
tailored along the Maoist model of rural insurgency. Whereas there was 
some attempted ideological justification of the sustained and large-scale 
violence directed against civilians, the general understanding of the sit-
uation is that the regime was motivated by extreme xenophobia against 
those of non-Khmer ethnicity but also sought a grotesque purity within 
the general population that quite simply defies logical explanation. This 
regime appears to have utilized violence to terrorize the entire popula-
tion into general submission in order to reorder society and its struc-
tural norms with a seeming emphasis on proletarian values and a clear 
disdain for education and the arts. Sorpong Peou also mentions an ide-
ology of radical egalitarianism, marked by extreme suspicion of urban 
dwellers and those engaged in capitalist enterprises. The violence also 
served as a cover for the inability of the Khmer Rouge to govern the 
country after the guerrilla victory.
The sustained nature of the violence in the Cambodian case far sur-
passes that of Indonesia in terms of total death toll and has often been 
classified as genocide. Evidence suggests that more people in the country 
perished as a result of malnutrition, starvation, and disease than outright 
killing. Whereas the Cambodian case falls under violence associated with 
regime transition, it is different to the extent that the Khmer Rouge was 
keen to erase all practices and memories associated with the past. Hence 
the violence and hardship had a far more pervasive and sinister charac-
ter. And since the entire population was involved in the violence, it was 
clearly more than exemplary, in the way the term has been used thus far. 
Sorpong Peou tells us that the Khmer Rouge was motivated by extreme 
anxiety about its vulnerability in the urban areas and regularly purged 
its own cadres, so that the violence occurred within the state guiding the 
“revolution,” as well as against its perceived enemies. And since the vio-
lence went all the way to the top and the movement was broad-based, 
there was a very real sense in which the situation spun out of control and 
the violence was nihilistic in character.
The Burma/Myanmar case presents a rather unique situation: a coun-
try where a military junta being challenged by the collapse of its socialist- 
style government was also challenged by a segment of the local urban 
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population. A nervous government, unable to cope with the challenge, 
used indiscriminate violence against its own citizens, with seeming dis-
unity within the ranks of the military on the proper course of action. 
The closed nature of the state allowed for the incident to draw much less 
publicity than it would have otherwise, and there has been little serious 
effort to deal with this episode in the country’s recent history. In 2007 
the military brutally crushed an uprising that was led by the monkhood 
and subsequently detained a large number of monks. The military elite 
have demonstrated from their response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 that 
human security is not high on the agenda. In fact, the manner in which 
the referendum on the new constitution was rushed through in the after-
math of the cyclone indicates the regime’s obsession with its own longev-
ity and security. And the election of November 2010 was intentionally 
designed to sideline Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD and privilege the 
military’s Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), which was in 
turn represented by military elite who simply changed into mufti. It is 
therefore clear that the military has no interest in relinquishing its power 
anytime soon and is in fact trying very hard to ensconce its position while 
attempting to gain a measure of international credibility through apply-
ing minimalist democratic procedures.
The Tiananmen incident in China is not unlike the Burma/Myanmar 
case in that the regime in power felt threatened by public demonstrations 
in urban areas calling for greater democratization. Unable to cope with 
the rising tide of dissent, the regime in power deployed the military and 
resorted to violence. Unlike the Burma/Myanmar case, however, the Chi-
nese incident attracted widespread publicity internationally, because the 
timing of the violence coincided with the period when communism was 
being challenged in Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union, under 
the Gorbachev government, had proclaimed its policy of perestroika and 
glasnost. Consequently, protestors may well have been taken in by the 
euphoria of broader global developments that appeared to suggest the 
weakening of left-leaning ideologies. There is some evidence to suggest 
that the protestors in Burma/Myanmar were similarly inspired.
Finally the Mendiola Bridge massacre in the Philippines shares a 
number of traits with the other cases as well, although the contestation 
of what actually transpired is probably much more troubling. Like the 
Thai case, the state in the Philippines appears to commit acts of political 
violence with impunity and is never brought to account for its actions. 
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The massacre also occurred within the framework of a democratic polity 
that had just entered the political fray against the background of a mili-
tary authoritarian regime that was deeply embedded in the Cold War and 
supported by the United States. Whereas the number of victims was the 
least in comparison to the other cases examined here, the new democratic 
regime’s reliance on the military for its stability and legitimacy appears 
to have compromised President Aquino. Importantly, the structuration 
of the Philippine political economy, which draws on its Spanish colonial 
past, appears to make the country impervious to any form of structural 
economic and social changes. If so, it is likely that instances of political 
violence in the Philippines will never be resolved and that the state and its 
organs have effectively been captured by the ruling elite, who then deter-
mine their interests and enemies. Rommel A. Curaming, however, does 
not apportion willful behavior that regularly legitimizes violence to the 
elite. Rather, he takes note of the impossibility of any form of resolution 
of past violence under existing structural conditions.
instrumental versus exemplary Violence
Vincent Boudreau argues in his chapter that East Asian states were much 
more prone to violence at the time of state formation as a result of a larger 
number of contenders for power, compared to the European experience. 
Yet as essentially postcolonial states, East Asian states were under pres-
sures that were ameliorated by colonial structures and practices and the 
demonstration effect of old states and international norms within the 
broader global context. He also argues that since states in Northeast Asia 
evolved from an absolutist authoritarian tradition, subsequent regimes 
were less prone to instrumental violence. In other words, certain norms 
associated with political hegemony and attendant practices had already 
been established, and subsequent actions emphasized regulations for 
mass participation.
The absence of the distinction between state and regime security in 
many parts of East Asia meant that it was not uncommon for violence to 
be directed against detractors or challengers to state power. The interest-
ing question that arises from such considerations is: when can a state’s use 
of violence be regarded as legitimate? Presumably conditions that war-
rant the exercise of such violence are those that truly jeopardize the state 
and perhaps the regime in power. Yet it would be difficult to arrive at 
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an acceptable definition of what constitutes a threat. The reason for this 
assertion is simply the fact that such calls are invariably an exercise in 
judgment, and authoritarian systems typically tend to err on the side of 
their own safety. And if the incumbent regime monopolizes power and 
discourse during the outbreak of violence, to redress it afterward becomes 
problematic. Some cultures also appear more prone to violence than oth-
ers, and violence inflicted on marginal or marginalized communities is 
more easily explained and accepted, as Boudreau contends. Such violence 
is also more likely to be instrumental and more intense since the main-
stream political community remains unaffected by it. Additionally, even 
democratic regimes have been prone to excesses in the past, and ideologi-
cal considerations and broadly defined notions of “national interest” have 
been loosely used against those deemed a threat.
If it is indeed true that violence perpetuated during state-building is 
functional and therefore perhaps justified in the evolution of the state, 
then almost all of the cases examined in this volume would not strictly 
qualify as state-building enterprises. There are two possible exceptions to 
this generalization. The first is the Japanese case, where center-periphery 
tensions appear to have exaggerated the Japanese military’s feeling of vul-
nerability when fighting US troops in Okinawa. Quite apart from Oki-
nawa being a marginal community, a state of war with foreign forces on 
its soil would surely have constituted an existential threat to the state as 
previously constituted. The second case of a functional claim to violence 
can be made in the Myanmar case. After all, the military does not control 
the entire country and has negotiated peace agreements with seventeen 
different ceasefire groups that retain control over contiguous territory and 
the weapons in their possession. In fact, if anything, the cards have fallen 
in their favor, since the terms require the military to serve them notice 
when there is encroachment into these areas. The government’s attempts 
to try and convert these private armies into a Border Guard Force (BGF) 
have not succeeded, and in 2011, when the government attempted to 
construct a dam in Kachin state with Chinese assistance, there was an 
outbreak of conflict between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and 
the military; the situation has been stalemated since, and the fighting has 
spread to other parts of the state. The larger of these groups are clearly 
unprepared to give up the territories that they have controlled for over 
half a decade. Consequently, the process of state construction remains 
incomplete even with regard to territoriality in Myanmar. The military 
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is therefore understandably harsh toward those who would challenge the 
regime in power and threaten its legitimacy, which is being given a demo-
cratic varnish.
The Philippine case provides clues to a number of other difficult con-
siderations. Can we apportion blame onto the state if the political execu-
tive did not condone the outbreak of violence and would likely have acted 
to prevent it? In other words, the assumption that the state is a unitary 
one may well be problematic in some cases. Curaming also alludes to 
another important consideration. He argues that at the time when the 
violence broke out at the Mendiola Bridge in 1987, both the perpetrator 
and the victims had much to gain in terms of political leverage if violence 
actually broke out. In such a situation, it will clearly be much more diffi-
cult to apportion blame. And it is for this reason that the state’s version of 
the events that transpired is subjected to careful scrutiny. And if differing 
interpretations of what actually transpired cannot be effectively brought 
to a close, then resolution becomes all the more difficult, worsened in the 
Philippine case by embedded elite interests within the state’s executive and 
judicial institutions. Douglas Kammen also points out how the scale and 
intensity of the violence in Indonesia were a function of whether regional 
military commanders were allied with Sukarno and how the navy and the 
air force were much less complicit in the violence than the army and the 
RPKAD. Hence, the evidence from these two cases does appear to sug-
gest that the state may not be unitary when violence is utilized. Or to put 
it differently, elements within enforcement agencies have some leeway in 
determining the nature of the response when confronted with challenges.
The linkage between state and regime is nebulous in many parts of 
East Asia, and some elite in difficult situations may well truly believe that 
challenges to those in power constitute an existential threat. For example, 
when the Burmese military resorted to violence in 1988 to quell student 
protests, it was a regime with a deep sense of insecurity and one that had 
not been openly challenged in urban areas for a long time. Added to this 
was the fact that the collapse of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) and 
the defection of its sword arms, the Wa and the Kokang, clearly threat-
ened the territoriality of the state. The Burmese military, since the coup 
that placed it in power in 1962, had not been able to control many of the 
highland areas that were inhabited by ethnic minorities. It was in light 
of this threat that the military government quickly negotiated ceasefire 
arrangements with the major ethnic armies from 1988 onward. Addition-
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ally, the military regards itself as the champion of the state and its citi-
zens against local detractors and foreigners, as Mary Callahan informs 
us.3 Consequently, in the Burmese case, the conflation between state and 
regime security clearly obtains.
If the distinction is between segments of a target audience rather 
than actions, as Boudreau suggests, then two more cases examined here 
will also qualify as examples of instrumental violence, albeit state forma-
tion was not the motive for the violence. The case of Kwangju in Korea 
targeted the inhabitants of a specific locale, while the violence directed 
against the PKI in Indonesia was equally instrumental in identifying the 
members of an organization and its sympathizers. In the Indonesian case, 
however, the violence acquired its own momentum after some time, and 
as Douglas Kammen tells us, there was much settling of private scores as 
well. Both examples qualify in terms of categorical violence, rather than 
violence directed at the general population at large. Nonetheless, Nam-
hee Lee regards the Korean case as an example of exemplary rather than 
instrumental violence.
There were a number of other factors that aided widespread and sys-
tematic abuse of state power. The monopoly of power exercised by the 
state and those who led it implied that such power could be abused with 
little consideration of norms of proper or ethical governance. There were 
few structural or institutional restraints; even where such obstacles were 
present, they could have been totally ignored. More important, individu-
als and agencies that were involved in and directed state violence invari-
ably exercised traditional power in the Weberian sense. In other words, 
elements of power and its availability were associated with specific indi-
viduals and often agencies that they led. In many instances such agen-
cies were those tasked to preserve order and that therefore could claim 
a legitimate use of state power as well. Since there were often no clear 
distinctions made between internal and external security functions, the 
task of maintaining state security more often than not actually fell on the 
military. Internal and external security was viewed as indivisible, espe-
cially during the Cold War; as a result, enemies of the state were present 
inside the country as well. Consequently, military authoritarian regimes 
that were guided by ideological considerations of threat definition would 
have regarded the use of force against “subversive” elements as necessary 
and justifiable. As a result of such tendencies, it is arguable that state vio-
lence that occurred under military authoritarian regimes was regarded as 
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justifiable under the circumstances in which the state and international 
community then existed.
Even in the most widespread case of violence documented in the 
region—that associated with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia—Sorpong 
Peou argues in this volume that the regime suffered from a general per-
ception of vulnerability and weakness at the individual and corporate lev-
els. The Chinese “counterrevolutionary riots” in Tiananmen Square are 
said to have stemmed from insecurity resulting from reform-era initia-
tives. In the Thai case, although there was the threat of communist insur-
gency, personal antagonisms at the local level clearly appeared to have 
played a part. To recognize such justification does not necessarily mean 
to condone it, however. Rather, it merely introduces the importance of 
time- and situation-specific considerations into the equation.
While dealing with military-authoritarian-regime types, it may be 
useful to note that such regimes often employ armed groups with which 
they maintain loose linkages. In fact, history has shown that authori-
tarian, totalitarian, and communist regimes often employ idealistic and 
energetic youth groups to further their ideological goals. Nazi Germany 
and Communist China under Mao Zedong were notorious for the use of 
such youth groups. These groups enabled the state to mobilize resources 
to engage in activities that might be regarded as unlawful or extra-legal. 
There is sufficient evidence to indicate that paramilitary and youth orga-
nizations were often involved in such indiscriminate violence in East 
Asia. The Indonesian and Thai cases bear this out clearly. And both coun-
tries continue to mobilize such resources when their security forces are 
stretched or when their governments desire to retain some distance from 
indiscriminate violence. The Indonesian military mobilized many such 
groups before and after the Timor referendum, like Aitarak, Besi Merah 
Putih (Red and White Iron), and Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), 
and Thailand did the same to counter the violence in its southern prov-
inces. The use of such vigilante paramilitary and youth groups is clearly 
detrimental to the proper pursuit of law and order.
The exercise of traditional power in the states examined came with 
other connotative values as well. These included the fact that the appro-
priation of power and its exercise, no matter how illegitimate, could not 
be challenged. There were quite simply no mechanisms for changes and 
challenges. It is noteworthy that in a number of instances, a single indi-
vidual was often associated with the lengthy tenure of an abusive gov-
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ernment. This was certainly the case with the Soeharto government that 
rose from the violence against the PKI and its sympathizers and went on 
to cement a thirty-one-year leadership of the country. Additionally, the 
military, from which Soeharto first obtained power before consolidating 
his independence, remains well entrenched in Indonesian politics. Alter-
natively, the continuation of an existing structural situation that perpetu-
ated power in a particular institution, as in the case of the Communist 
Party in China and embedded elite interests of the political executive in 
the Philippines, would also have thwarted addressing state violence.
If the state and its exercise of power were unrestrained, conversely, 
society was emasculated. Since the state often targeted specific groups or 
individuals as its enemies, it could generally continue its activities with-
out broad-based challenges. And even in instances where resistance to 
such violence obtained, it was often muted or easily repressed. What soci-
etal structures existed were often co-opted by the state or placed under 
intense scrutiny for “subversive” activities that threatened the state. At 
best, some of these traditional structures could offer solace at the indi-
vidual or very low levels of organization. In this regard it would make lit-
tle sense to speak of state-society relations as we understand them today. 
The state quite simply existed independent of society and was often able 
to exert its will on society and attendant structures on its own terms. The 
only contingent conditions were probably the collapse of the regime from 
internal fissures; an uprising against it; or, in some cases, the withdrawal 
of external legitimacy. Alternatively, if the violence was exemplary and 
related to certain types of proscribed behavior, as Boudreau argues, then 
the general population learns to live by such proscriptions over time and 
internalize them.
Perpetrators and Victims of Violence
The apportionment of blame for violence and the identification of vic-
tims are also central to this book. The military appears to have played 
a key role in an overwhelming number of cases of violence; military 
involvement was clearly the case for the Northeast Asian countries dis-
cussed here, although subtle differences obtain. For example, in the case 
of China, the military acted under the orders of the leadership of the 
Communist Party. In Southeast Asia, some distinctions surface: in the 
Philippines, the marines and the police were responsible for the violence, 
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whereas in the Cambodian case, the Khmer Rouge, responsible for the 
ongoing massacre, constituted both the regime and the military. Sorpong 
Peou also mentions the faceless organization “Angka,” a creation of the 
Khmer Rouge to which blame was attributed for both the violence and 
the identification of victims.
As for the victims, in China, they were predominantly “cross-class” 
demonstrators; in Japan, the violence was aimed at Okinawans; in South 
Korea, the victims were from Kwangju. The Japanese and Korean cases 
share similarities in that the violence was directed against a region- 
specific target. The Cambodian case, despite having a large number of 
victims, targeted urban dwellers, intellectuals and artisans, minorities, 
and religious groups in more systematic ways. In Indonesia, although the 
victims were initially members of the PKI and their sympathizers, there 
is also evidence of violence that targeted political enemies at a time of 
general turbulence and regime transition. The Myanmar case points to 
students and their sympathizers as the general targets of violence, and 
in the Philippine case peasants bore the brunt of the violence. The Thai 
study suggests that average citizens who were labeled as communists were 
subjected to violence.
An interesting correlation is that between state violence and the sta-
tus of the regime in question. Four broad categories emerge from the case 
studies: regime crisis, regime transition, regime defense, and law-and-
order considerations. The Chinese Tiananmen incident was clearly jus-
tified as a law-and-order issue, while the Japanese case appears to have 
been regarded as wartime defense of the state. The Korean case is a lit-
tle complicated: it involved power transition within an existing regime, 
although it could be construed as regime defense as well, if the detrac-
tors are thought of as contenders for a different regime type. The Indo-
nesian and Philippine cases also point toward violence associated with 
regime transition/consolidation, while the Cambodian and Thai cases 
tend toward regime defense. The Myanmar case differs from the others 
in that the regime was in crisis. The collapse of the BSPP government and 
Ne Win’s “official” retirement created the crisis, which in turn spawned 
the protests and subsequent violence.
Whatever the specific circumstances of the situation may have been, it 
is clear that regimes engaged in violence against their own citizens sensed 
a threat to their authority and the exercise of power. Unwilling to give up 
power and framing the national discourse against protestors or challeng-
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ers by defining them as enemies of the state, these regimes resorted to 
the use of force. Given the conflation between state and regime interests 
that typically obtained and in the absence of competing structures at the 
political and social levels, they were well placed to exercise the monop-
oly on the “legitimate use of force.” In other words, as far as the regimes 
in power were concerned, their response was justified in returning the 
state to normalcy. And since police and military functions were not kept 
discrete, as in democracies, the military, with its far greater capacity for 
violence, was often utilized. The claim that those against whom violence 
was used threatened the regime in some way appears to have provided 
both sufficient provocation and subsequent rationalization for the use of 
force. Whereas the Cold War provided an ideological cloak in a num-
ber of instances, especially in the case of military authoritarian regimes, 
socialist and communist states also appropriated violence. In this regard, 
state violence has been a phenomenon of both the extreme right and the 
extreme left.
Resolution of State Violence
As for political transition and reconciliation in the aftermath of the vio-
lence, it has not always been forthcoming. In fact, as mentioned earlier, 
only the Korean and Cambodian cases have been attended to with some 
amount of rigor. Of these two, only the Cambodian case has emphasized 
retribution, and this approach was largely inspired by pressures emanat-
ing from the international community. The Korean attempt at resolution, 
which involved an admixture of retribution and reconciliation, obtained 
within the framework of a democratizing polity. And Japan, which counts 
itself as a well-developed democracy today, has yet to address some of 
its past episodes of state violence. A deep culture of taboo continues to 
obtain, although past misdeeds have transformed the nature of the state 
and led in turn to far greater recognition of fundamental liberties at the 
state level. Important gains have also been made by community-based 
lobby and interest groups. And in the case of Japan, the courts have also 
been engaged in interpreting state powers in the face of legal challenges. 
This separation of powers between the judiciary and the political execu-
tive may well be the harbinger of greater changes to come, if civic and 
interest groups force the state to respond to citizen-initiated lawsuits.
As for questions regarding the postviolence situation and how states 
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have attempted to deal with it, there is a wide range of outcomes in the 
manner of resolution. China has been able to deflect some of the pressures 
associated with Tiananmen as a result of rising affluence and a youth cul-
ture that cements regime legitimacy. Although there have been no for-
mal attempts at resolving the situation, the regime may well address it at 
some point in the future when it feels more confident. In the meantime, 
the regime has permitted far greater levels of associational life through 
civic organizations. A major reason why states have not addressed pre-
vious episodes of violence also has to do with state priorities and chal-
lenges. For example, it is arguable that in the Chinese case, the threats, or 
the regime-perceived threats, deriving from peripheral areas and minor-
ity communities, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, constitute a much 
more urgent matter than trying to reconcile the Tiananmen incident. 
After all, within the Chinese government’s perception of priorities the 
maintenance of the state and its sovereignty is an overriding consider-
ation. The same argument could be made with regard to the Taiwan issue. 
In the perception of the government, these are all issues that may well be 
regarded as state-building rather than aimed toward regime consolida-
tion or transition, to borrow Boudreau’s terms. Then there are tactics that 
regimes continually utilize to try and make amends with victims of state 
violence, albeit in an often piecemeal and opaque manner. Expressions 
of Chinese national pride at the country’s new place in the international 
order and the breathtaking pace of socioeconomic changes blunt calls to 
address state violence, as demonstrated in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and 
Kate Merkel-Hess’s chapter. In fact, public sentiment almost justifies the 
path taken, since it constitutes a demonstration effect of the successful 
path taken, as opposed to that which was not.
In Japan, the government has attempted a backhanded apology by 
honoring the war dead as heroes, and revisionist history textbooks have 
been allowed to coexist alongside official scripts. In the meantime, how-
ever, the Okinawan community has introduced a unanimous demand for 
recognition of wartime forced suicides. South Korea has been the most 
progressive in resolving past violence through compensating and honor-
ing its victims. The initiators of this policy were the regime under Roh Tae 
Woo, which came to power in 1988, and the more recent regime under 
Kim Young Sam. The political opposition took up the cause, and acts to 
commence resolution of the situation were legalized.
As for Southeast Asia, the new regime under the Hun Sen government 
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in Cambodia committed itself to a resolution of the situation in coopera-
tion with the United Nations, and tribunals to address the situation are 
ongoing at the time of writing. The resolution has adopted the European 
Commission’s type of retributive justice, which seeks to prosecute the 
perpetrators of violence. However, the government has placed some lim-
its on whom the courts may try and has warned international prosecutors 
and the community that extending the mandate and the target group to 
be prosecuted risks unraveling the peace that has obtained thus far. This 
intervention and threat naturally serve regime interests, since Khmer 
Rouge collaborators are in power at the present time. The Indonesian situ-
ation remains unresolved up until now, although it appears to be a matter 
of time before civic groups and NGOs place resolution firmly on the coun-
try’s political agenda. The residual fears of the families of victims are also 
an important reason why there have been few calls from that quarter to 
address the violence and mete out some form of justice. The military also 
continues to remain an important national institution, with territorial- 
deployment and administrative functions, despite serious attempts at 
administrative and fiscal decentralization in the post-Soeharto period.
In the case of Myanmar, the regime is preoccupied with reestablish-
ing a modicum of domestic and international legitimacy that was lost 
after the collapse of the Burma Socialist Program Party–led government. 
Additionally, there is the important issue of integrating territories and 
peoples that are currently being controlled by ethnic armies that chal-
lenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state. As in the Chinese 
case, these are issues that may well fall within the ambit of state build-
ing. The patronage of the Buddhist Sangha by the regime in Myanmar 
and its expenditures and upkeep of pagodas in the country are meant to 
grant the regime traditional legitimacy in accordance with Buddhist vir-
tues. In the Myanmar case, the state continued with a repressive policy 
while slowly increasing tolerance toward local and foreign NGOs. Initial 
attempts at multiparty democracy were frustrated, and tension contin-
ues to exist between the regime and the political opposition. Elements 
of the political opposition, however, have tried to break the impasse by 
participating in the 2010 election to structurally attempt the introduction 
of opposition in parliament, and Aung San Suu Kyi was released from 
house detention. The government started negotiations with Suu Kyi, and 
it released some two hundred political prisoners in late 2011. And in 
April 2012, the NLD was allowed to register as a political party and suc-
274  N. GANESAN and  SUNG CHULL KIM
cessfully won forty-three out of the forty-five seats that were available for 
contestation. Consequently, Suu Kyi is now a member of parliament and 
has been issued a passport for overseas travel as well. At the time of writ-
ing she is in the middle of a European tour that includes a stop in Norway 
to collect her Nobel Prize for Peace. Within the country many reforms are 
ongoing, and the international community has significantly relaxed its 
sanctions. In fact, many Western countries are now spearheading invest-
ment in Myanmar.
In the case of the Philippines, much has been done by way of sym-
bolic resolution of the situation. President Corazon Aquino conveyed her 
condolences as head of state to the families of the victims of the violence, 
although there has been no conclusive outcome from the fact-finding 
mission that was commissioned. This mission continues to remain unsat-
isfactory to interested parties, and violence is ongoing over the issue of 
agrarian land reform, even though a monument to honor those who died 
at Mendiola has also been built. The incident remains a major political 
issue that regularly crops up on the national agenda. In Thailand, induced 
testimony brought the Red Drum incident to the fore, although there are 
still disagreements over the actual number of victims. Student organiza-
tions, the Interior Ministry, and elements within the military initiated the 
process of resolution, but no concrete actions have followed. As a result, 
whereas the military has admitted to the violence, there has been nei-
ther accountability nor reconciliation. Rather, victims have been recon-
ciled to the “inevitability” of the situation and the culture of impunity, as 
described by Tyrell Haberkorn in this volume.
The initiation of retributive justice generally appears less likely in 
the East Asian cases examined thus far. There are multiple reasons for 
this assertion, including, importantly, retaining the memory of violence 
and summoning the political will to have it addressed at some point. The 
advocacy of such justice may suffer from disinterest and lethargy over 
time, especially when confronted with an authoritarian state. Notably, 
those who seek to keep such issues alive may themselves be branded 
as subversives and harshly dealt with. After all, repression is the easiest 
means of erasing negative memories associated with the state. As for the 
question of political will, successor regimes may naturally not see it as 
in their best interest to address past misdeeds. Regimes may regard such 
acts as unnecessary or beyond their purview. They may also paper over 
such events in order to demonstrate their willingness to forge a new social 
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compact that is devoid of the emotional baggage associated with the past. 
The political will to address past crimes may be forthcoming if a new 
regime is committed to specific changes in policy output and acquires its 
political mandate on the basis of campaigning for such changes prior to 
coming into power. Such drastic changes in regimes and their orienta-
tions are unlikely to obtain in states with more authoritarian structures 
and values. In any event, the regular conflation of interests between state 
and regime security makes the possibility of such changes in developing 
countries even more remote.
For all the reasons mentioned above and others that may be unique 
to specific countries, we conclude that East Asian countries are far more 
likely to engage in restorative rather than retributive justice. This is not to 
suggest that such states and societies are not keen to punish those asso-
ciated with state violence and clear the names and memories of those 
persecuted. Rather, it appears to be the likely path toward some form of 
reconciliation that is intended to have a longer-lasting and less conten-
tious transformative effect on state-society relations. This situation is 
likely to eventuate, especially if the previously hypothesized dichotomy 
between retributive and restorative justice corresponds broadly to the lib-
eral and nonliberal traditions regarding law and human rights. Nonethe-
less, as mentioned at the outset, the restorative approach has its detractors 
too, who are interested in bringing those responsible for the abuse of state 
coercive power to account. Enforcing such accountability early on also 
has the demonstration effect of establishing norms of conduct for state 
and regime utilization of coercive power. Whatever approach is deemed 
necessary and workable, some form of neutral truth- or fact-finding com-
mission is necessary at the outset in order to establish the terms of refer-
ence for both the perpetrators and the victims of violence.
Political transition and Reconciliation 
in the east asian context
The case studies that have been examined in this study yield no conclu-
sive evidence about the nature of the relationship between political transi-
tion and reconciliation. The South Korean and Cambodian cases present 
starkly different findings. In the former, democratization was the major 
spur of attempts to deal with past violence, whereas in the case of com-
munist Cambodia, the pressure of international opinion and the United 
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Nations led to the efforts at meting out retributive justice. And in the case 
of all the other countries examined, no settlement has been attempted or 
realized thus far. In any event, it is likely that states will find it easier to 
deal with events that did not involve large numbers of deaths in the first 
instance. For this reason, the Philippines may well find past violence eas-
ier to deal with: the Mendiola Bridge massacre resulted in relatively few 
casualties, although structural factors appear to have inhibited such an 
outcome. Conversely and notwithstanding the Cambodian example, it is 
likely that countries like China, Indonesia, and Myanmar will take much 
longer to deal with their past. Whereas it appears illogical that events 
involving mass casualties will not be accorded priority, the reality of the 
situation is that the number of affected and interested parties makes such 
an undertaking a large national one. And for this reason alone, only 
strong states with significant political will and the proper mindset are 
able to attempt to deal with past injustices. “Proper mindset” may seem 
an odd phrase in this context, but it refers to the regime’s legitimacy and 
general principles of governance. For example, the Chinese and Myan-
mar governments continue to regard those who were subjected to state 
violence as essentially subversive elements that sought the overthrow of 
state power. Whatever the lexicon may be, it is important to realize that 
unless the discourse of the state shifts from emphasizing regime security 
to stressing some conception of human security, reconciliation is unlikely 
to be forthcoming. And as noted earlier, if the violence was indeed large-
scale, elements of the state’s coercive agencies that were responsible for 
the violence are likely to be still embedded within the social structure or 
to continue to have their interests structurally represented and protected.
And what is the nature of the relationship between reconciliation and 
regime transition? We posit that it is unlikely for states, especially author-
itarian ones, to undertake reconciliation unless it serves regime interests 
in some way. A hybrid regime that is not entirely authoritarian and that 
seeks to entrench a corporatist or developmentalist ideology may well 
find some interest in undertaking such a task. This would especially be the 
case if sufficient time had elapsed to distance or disassociate the regime 
from past abuses of state power. Apart from changes to regime-specific 
characteristics and legitimacy, reconciliation may take place within the 
framework of revolutionary change inspired by a mass protest movement 
or alternatively by a regime that opts to drastically change its policies, 
even at the risk of its own potential displacement, as happened in the 
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South African case. However, in epochal terms, the period of revolutions 
appears to be over, and authoritarian regimes with benevolent and pro-
gressive leaders rarely exist. In light of such international norms, politi-
cal transition is far more likely to lead to attempts to address past state 
excesses.
In any event, to draw this discussion to a close, regimes must abide 
by certain international norms of conduct, and there must be structural 
restraints on the exercise of coercive power. There must also be much 
stronger state-society relations and interaction, and the state must better 
reflect the constitution and will of its people. It is hoped that as countries 
examine their past and history is recorded, matters involving state vio-
lence will be seriously addressed. Failure to do so will invite legitimizing 
an essentially illegitimate use of power and violence. Ethical conduct at 
the individual, societal, and state levels requires nothing short of such 
redress.
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